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the oligarchs had a vested interest in
trying to preserve the status quo of partial reform, since further
liberalisation would compete away their oligopolistic profits
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the
oligarchs were parasitic on the russian state. they were draining it
of assets and revenues while profiteering from the high interest
treasury bonds (gkos) issued to cover the yawning budget deficit
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it was this spiralling pyramid of gkos
that was the main factor behind the 1998 crash
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the oligarchs lacked a political strategy
for legitimating their rule in the eyes of the russian public
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the oligarchs were deeply divided among
themselves: they did not trust each other, and fought bitterly over
successive privatisations
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the oligarchs did not have an
institutional procedure for resolving their internal disputes
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they competed for the favour of the
kremlin courtiers (the 慒amily? who controlled access to the
president
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the oligarchic system stalled russia抯
evolution towards what is regarded in the west as a 憂ormal?market
economy in mid-stream
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the economy had been sufficiently
liberalised to enable the oligarchs to enrich themselves, but not so
much as to expose them to effective competition
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this situation was inefficient and morally
indefensible
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